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Abstract
We study firm investment in abatement technology under a linear-demand and het-
erogeneous firm framework. In contrast to results in existing studies, our findings indi-
cate that firms’ investments in advanced abatement technology exhibit an inverted-U-shape
with respect to firms’ productivity. In response to tightened environmental regulations,
more-productive firms raise their respective investments in abatement technology, whereas
less-productive firms do the opposite; Pollution emission intensity of a firm decreases with
productivity level. The key theoretical predictions are confirmed by empirical tests using
Chinese data.
Keywords: Pollution; heterogenous firms; abatement technology; emission intensity; China
JEL Code: Q50
1 Introduction
People have become increasingly more concerned about the environment. To understand the
pattern and impacts of pollution, researchers have largely undertaken studies at the country and
industry levels. However, as firms are pollution generators, related issues must be examined at
the firm level. Traditional studies of environmental economics work with models that assume
representative firm. This is at odds with reality as in reality firms are diﬀerent in many aspects
and have diﬀerent environmental behaviors. Recent empirical studies have found that larger firms
or more-productive firms have lower emission intensity (Shadbegian and Gray, 2003; Forslid et
al., 2011), and larger firms spend more in environmental protection (Biehl and Klassen, 2008).
The lack of theoretical studies at the firm level is due to the unavailability of a general
framework that characterizes firm heterogeneity. The Melitz (2003) model in international trade
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can be used to analyze heterogenous firms’ environmental behaviors. Empirical studies at the
firm-level are also scarce because of the diﬃculty in obtaining firm-level environmental data.
The present paper makes a contribution to the literature by exploring issues along these two
directions.
Recent theoretical studies have focused on heterogeneous firms’ environmental behavior.
Those studies generally concluded that the pollution emission intensity of a firm decreases with
respect to its productivity. Some studies also showed that a firm’s investment in abatement
technology increases with respect to its productivity. The present paper confirms the decreasing
emission intensity result, but shows that firms’ investments in abatement technology exhibit an
inverted-U-shape with respect to productivity: when productivity is low, an increase in pro-
ductivity raises a firm’s investment level, but when productivity is high, a further increase in
productivity reduces a firm’s investment level.
The inverted-U-shaped investment prediction is based on a mix of the Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) model of heterogeneous firms and the Copeland and Taylor (2003) model of pollution.
When a firm is not very productive, an increase in productivity induces it to increase its produc-
tion, which will generate more pollution. It is optimal for the firm to make a larger investment
in abatement technology. When a firm is very productive, a further increase in productivity also
induces more production, but at a lower rate of increase, as it is more concerned of the price drop.
With linear demand, although a more-productive firm always produces more output in equilib-
rium, it may use less inputs and thus generates less pollution, which implies lower investment in
abatement technology. To test our prediction, we introduce the productivity square term as a
regressor in the standard regression model. Our empirical analysis using Chinese firm-level data
supports the inverted-U-shaped investment pattern.
Our paper makes a number of significant contributions to the growing literature on heteroge-
nous firms and environment. First, all existing theoretical studies use the Melitz (2003) model
from the trade literature to analyze the diﬀerential eﬀects of trade on heterogeneous firms’ en-
vironmental performance. For example, Bojona and Missio (2010) showed that more-productive
firms are exporters, and they also have lower emission intensity than less-productive firms. Cui
(2011) obtained similar results in the presence of the possibility of investment in clean technol-
ogy.1 Although our model is built on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model, which is also a trade
model, our emphasis is on the relationship between firm productivity and emission intensity on
the one hand, and that between firm productivity and investment in abatement technology on
the other hand, abstract from the eﬀect of trade.
Second, few studies have explicitly analyzed investment in abatement technology using the
Copeland and Taylor (2003) cum Melitz (2003) model. Cui (2011) reinterpreted technological
adoption in the Bustos (2011) model as adoption of diﬀerent environmental technology, with clean
1Yokoo (2009) also introduced firm heterogeneity to an environment model, but examined a very diﬀerent
issue: how environmental regulation aﬀects a country’s competitiveness, i.e., the Porter hypothesis. The result is
very simple: tightening regulation drives out less-productive firms, thereby increasing the average productivity.
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technology associated with larger fixed cost and smaller marginal cost than dirty technology. Cui
(2011) showed that high-productivity firms adopt the clean technology. Forslid et al. (2011) found
that under some parameter restrictions, firm investment in abatement technology is positively
related to firm productivity. On the contrary, we show that investment in abatement technology
exhibits an inverted-U-shape with respect to firm productivity. Thus, we must appeal to data
to resolve the diﬀerence. Forslid et al. (2011) found empirical support to their prediction using
Swedish firm-level data. Similarly we also find empirical support to our prediction using Chinese
data. Both works may be correct as these two papers used data from diﬀerent countries. However,
the Swedish data in Forslid et al. (2011) may in fact exhibit an inverted-U-shape had the
productivity square term been introduced in their regression model as was done in our model.2
Third, all existing papers predicted that more-productive firms have lower emission intensity.
This negative relationship between pollution emission and firm productivity is confirmed by a
number of empirical studies: Cui (2011) used detailed facility-level data of the US manufacturing
industry in year 2002 and 2005, Forslid et al. (2011) used Swedish firm-level data, and Shadbegian
and Gray (2003) used US paper mills industry data in 1985.3 Our study also confirms this
relationship using Chinese data.4
Fourth, we examine the eﬀects of environmental policy on firms’ environmental behavior and
obtain results that diﬀer from those in existing studies. Yokoo (2009) showed that, without
investment in abatement technology, tightening environmental regulation results in resource re-
allocation from less-productive firms to more-productive firms. Forslid et al. (2011) predicted
that the incentive to invest in abatement technology will fall for all firms in response to tighten-
ing environmental regulations. The logic is that as pollution tax goes up, firms will pollute less.
Thus, the incentive to invest in abatement technology will also fall due to economies of scale. On
the contrary, we find that although the scale eﬀect prevails among less-productive firms, more-
productive firms will increase their investment in abatement technology in response to a rise in
pollution tax. The reason behind this result is closely linked to the inverted-U-shaped investment
curve. As very productive firms do not have a large investment in abatement technology, the
marginal cost of raising investment level to reduce pollution is very eﬀective for them.5
The inverted-U shape has been mentioned in many studies of environmental economics. How-
ever, they often refer to phenomena diﬀerent from the present study. Most earlier studies in this
2Other empirical observations are subject to similar reinterpretation. Statistics Canada (2006) reported that
larger businesses in Canada spend more (in per employee terms) in environmental protection, and Biehl and
Klassen (2008) showed that within the same industry, larger firms spend more on pollution abating activities.
3There are a few firm-level empirical studies in trade literature that compare exporters and non-exporters with
regard to their environmental performance. According to these studies, exporters’ emission intensity is generally
lower than that of non-exporters (e.g., Holladay, 2010).
4 Some other studies relate firm attributes to firm environmental performance. Zhang et al. (2008) used data
collected from 89 Chinese firms from a county to show that firms with larger scale are more active in improving
their environmental management performance, which is measured based on 12 indicators obtained from surveys.
Earnhart and Lizal (2010) used US data based on firms from chemical manufacturing industry and found that
better managed firms (measured by return on sales) have higher levels of environmental management.
5There is another strand of literature that is concerned about the opposite direction: the eﬀect of regulation
on productivity (Gray, 1987). For example, Gray and Shadbegian (2003) found that tightened environmental
regulations result in higher abatement cost and, subsequently, lower productivity at the plant level.
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area are about the relationship between a country’s pollution and its economic development.
One interesting exception is the recent paper by Perino and Requate (2012) who examined the
inverted-U shape at the firm level. However, their focus and results are very diﬀerent from those
of the present paper. First, Perino and Requate (2012) showed that under the social optimum,
the share of firms adopting new abatement technology exhibits an inverted-U shape with respect
to the marginal damage of pollution. In contrast, we show that under individual firms’ optimal
choice, the relationship between a firm’s investment in advanced abatement technology and the
firm’s productivity exhibits inverted-U shape. Second, they showed that the relationship between
policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped. In contrast, we show
that in response to a stringent policy, the more productive firms increases their investment level
while the less eﬃcient firms reduce their investment level. Third, in their model, all firms have
the same productivity level, but with diﬀerent costs of adopting the new technology (in the exten-
sion, they allowed firms to have diﬀerent abatement cost curves). In contrast, our model builds
on the recent firm heterogeneity literature and assume that firms have diﬀerent productivity in
production but face the same abatement technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Sections
3 and 4 contain all the theoretical analyses and equilibrium results. Empirical analyses are
conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Our model introduces pollution and abatement technology (Copeland and Taylor, 2003) to a
heterogeneous-firms framework a la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Specifically, we consider an
economy with  identical consumers and two industries: a homogeneous goods industry and
a diﬀerentiated goods industry. We will treat homogenous goods as the numeraire, with prices
equal to one and perfect competition. Our focus is on the diﬀerentiated goods industry, which is
characterized by monopolistic competition.
2.1 Preference and demand
As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we assume that each consumer has the following quasi-linear
form
 = 0 + 
Z
∈Ω
− 1
2

µZ
∈Ω

¶2
− 1
2

Z
∈Ω
2  (1)
where  , and  are positive parameters; 0 is the consumption of the numeraire; Ω is the set
of all varieties from the diﬀerentiated goods industry; and  is the consumption of variety . A
consumer maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint. As a result, market demand for
variety  from all  consumers is  = − 
R
∈Ω −  .  measures substitutability among
varieties.
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Given the monopolistic competition in the diﬀerentiated goods industry, the seller of variety
 regards himself as a monopolist, and competition from all other varieties is totally captured in
the vertical intercept of the demand function. Let  be the measure of Ω (i.e., the total number
of varieties) and  = R∈Ω  be the aggregate price of all varieties. Then, the demand function
for variety  is
 = −  (2)
where
 =  +  +  and  =

  (3)
The demand slope  is exogenous, but the demand intercept  is endogenous, depending on
both the degree of product substitution (captured by ) and the degree of market competition
(captured by  and ).
2.2 Production and costs
Production of both the homogeneous good and diﬀerentiated goods needs to employ a composite
of inputs which may include labor, capital, and others. The technology for the homogeneous
goods is simple. By choosing units properly, we assume that producing one unit of homogeneous
goods requires one unit of inputs. Hence, input price is also equal to unity. We turn to production
of the diﬀerentiated goods next.
We will consider a short-run version of Melitz-Ottaviano model. Short run indicates a fixed
measure of incumbent firms and no free entry to the diﬀerentiated goods industry. All firms draw
their respective productivity parameter  randomly from a uniform distribution on [0 1]. After
observing its productivity level, each firm decides whether to stay in or leave the market. Each
firm that chooses to stay produces a distinct variety.
Production of each variety needs a bundle of inputs. Production generates pollution. However,
a standard pollution abatement technology is available to all firms at no cost. By devoting inputs
to abatement, a firm can reduce its pollution level. If a firm with productivity level  employs 
units of inputs and allocates a fraction,  ∈ [0 1], to pollution abatement, the amount of inputs
available for production is (1− ). As in Copeland and Taylor (2003), the output of the variety
that the firm produces is assumed to be
 =p(1− ) (4)
As a result, a firm’s actual productivity is endogenously determined where  is its exogenously
given productivity. Moreover, pollution generated from the firm’s production is  =  (),
where  () is the standard abatement function that satisfies  (0) = 1  (1) = 0 and 0 ()  0.
We follow Copeland and Taylor (2003) to assume  () = (1− ) 1 , where 0    1.  captures
the eﬀectiveness of the standard abatement technology: a larger  indicates lower eﬃciency as

  0.
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Aside from using a fraction of its inputs to reduce pollution, the firm can also invest in
advanced abatement technology to enhance the eﬃciency of pollution reduction. Let () denote
the advanced abatement technology with investment level , in terms of units of input bundles.
Then, the firm’s total pollution level will be
 = () () (5)
where ()  0,  0()  0, and  00 ()  0 . The convexity of (·) indicates that as investment
increases, its marginal eﬀectiveness goes down. For tractability, we assume () =
³
1
1+
´ 1
.
2.3 Environmental regulations
A government can regulate pollution in many ways. It can impose a pollution tax, a pollution
quota, a tax on using pollution-generating inputs, or a quantitative restriction on energy use. In
this paper, we consider pollution tax,  , imposed on each unit of pollution generated by a firm.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Optimal profits
Facing demand (2), production (4) and (5), and environmental regulation  , a firm with pro-
ductivity  chooses its total inputs , the fraction of inputs for abatement , and investment in
advanced technology  to maximize its profit. To this end, optimization is conducted by first
deriving the optimal profit for any given , denoted by (; ), and then deriving the optimal
investment level.
Using (4) and (5) to eliminate , the production function can be written as
 =p(1 + )1−  (6)
For a given , choosing the fraction  is equivalent to choosing the pollution level . Thus, we
can view output as a result of using both inputs and pollution in the production process. This
production function yields the following cost minimization problem:
min
{ }{ + } s.t. (1 + )
1− = 2
The first-order conditions are given by
 = (1 + )−11−
1 = (1 + )(1− )− 
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier. From these two equations we obtain

 =

1− 
1
  (7)
6
The equation above is the pollution-to-input ratio, which is independent of the productivity level.
With higher pollution tax, every firm allocates a larger fraction of inputs to pollution abatement
to reduce pollution. This ratio increases with , meaning that pollution-to-input ratio is higher
with a less eﬀective abatement technology. Using this result in (1 + )1− = 2, we can
solve for the optimal  and  as below
 =
µ
1− 
 
¶ 2
(1 + )   =
µ
1− 
 
¶−1 2
(1 + ) 
Hence, the minimum cost function for a given  is
 (; ) = (1 + )
2
where
 = 

 (1− )1− 
which increases with the pollution tax rate.
The firm chooses  to maximize its profit (excluding investment cost):
max0 [(− ) −  (; )]
The first-order condition yields the optimal output
(; ) = (1 + )
2[(1 + ) + ]  (8)
and the optimal price and profit, respectively,
(; ) = (1 + ) + 2
2[(1 + ) + ] , (; ) =
2(1 + )
4[(1 + ) + ]  (9)
3.2 Optimal investment in advanced abatement technology
Based on the previous analysis, we obtain the following optimization problem for :
max [(; )− ]
From (9), (; ) is strictly concave in . The optimal investment level can be obtained from
the first-order condition, which gives
() =
( √−2
2 − 1  0 for all  ∈ (∗ ∗∗)
0 otherwise,
(10)
where ∗ and ∗∗ are given as
∗ ≡ 
162
³
−p2 − 16´2 and ∗∗ ≡ 
162
³
+p2 − 16´2  (11)
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To examine how firms with diﬀerent productivity levels choose their respective investments, we
take the partial derivative of  with respect to productivity , for  ∈ (∗ ∗∗), which gives

 =
4−√
42
½  0 for all   162
 0 for all   162 (12)
The analysis leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (i) Only firms with intermediate levels of productivity,  ∈ (∗ ∗∗), make
positive investments in advanced abatement technology.
(ii). For those firms that make positive investments, the investment level increases with
productivity level when   162 but decreases with productivity level when   162 .
Depending on the relative value of  and , there are four representative cases, which are
all depicted in Figure 1. We can understand the inverted-U-shaped investment pattern mainly
through two channels: demand and regulation. Figure 1-1 represents the case in which ∗∗  1,
that is,   162
(+√2−16)2 . This condition is more likely to hold for weak market demand (small
) and weak environmental regulation (small ). Two observations are called from the above.
First, firms with very low or very high productivity do not make any investment in advanced
abatement technology. Second, the positive investment levels shows an inverted-U-shaped curve
with respect to the increase in productivity. Every firm faces the tradeoﬀ between allocating re-
sources to production to increase output and allocating resources to abatement to reduce payment
of pollution tax. However, the tradeoﬀ works diﬀerently for diﬀerent firms. Generally, a scale
eﬀect is observed, whereby it is optimal to invest more in abatement technology when pollution is
high. Least-productive firms do not use plenty of inputs in their production anyway and so do not
generate much pollution. Thus, investing in advanced abatement technology is not worthwhile.
For medium-productive firms, those with higher productivity produce more, hire more inputs,
and generate more pollution. Investing more in advanced abatement technology is worthwhile.
However, among high-productive firms, those with even higher productivity, although producing
more, hire less inputs and generate relatively less pollution. Naturally, they have lower levels of
investment in advanced abatement technology. For extremely-productive firms, they no longer
hire plenty of inputs any more, and consequently, they do not generate much pollution, which
suggests that they have zero investment in advanced abatement technology.
Figure 1-2 represents the case in which ∗∗  1 and 162  1, which together imply  ∈µ
162
(+√2−16)2 
2
16
¶
. Compared with the previous case, market demand is stronger in this case,
and environmental regulation is tougher. With stronger demand, all firms produce more than in
the previous case. Even the most eﬃcient firms ( = 1) also hire a large quantity of inputs. As a
large amount of inputs generates much pollution, the optimal decision for the most eﬃcient firms
is to render positive investment in advanced abatement technology. With tougher environmental
regulation, firms are more concerned about pollution tax, and thus, investment in abatement
8
Figure 1: Optimal Investments
technology. Nevertheless, the inverted-U-shape in investments still appears.
Figure 1-3 represents the case in which ∗  1 and 162  1, which together imply  ∈µ
2
16  16
2
(−√2−16)2
¶
. In this case, demand is weaker, and environmental regulation is tougher
compared with the case in Figure 1-2. Although firms do not produce as much as that in Figure
1-2, they need to be concerned more about pollution tax. As such, even the more eﬃcient firms
do not reduce their investment in advanced abatement technology. The inverted-U-shape does
not appear. Compared with Figure 1-2, Figure 1-3 shows more firms with zero investment in
abatement technology.
Figure 1-4 represents the case in which ∗  1, that is,   162
(−√2−16)2 . As the right-hand
side is an increasing function of , this condition is more likely to hold with smaller . This
is the case of weakest demand among all four cases. When demand is very weak, every firm
produces a small amount, and consequently, does not generate much pollution. This is also the
case with the toughest regulation, which induces all firms to allocate more inputs to pollution
abatement, resulting in low level of pollution (see (7)). Thus, investing in abatement technology
is not worthwhile.
Proposition 1 establishes the inverted-U-shape result, which contradicts existing results in
studies such as Forslid et al. (2011), who predicted that the level of abatement investment is an
increasing function of productivity. Two possible reasons may explain the diﬀerence: diﬀerent
approaches to modelling pollution and diﬀerent demand structure. First, pollution generated by
9
firms can be modeled through two approaches. One approach assumes that a firm’s pollution
emission is proportional to the amount of input it uses, called the input-pollution approach. The
other approach assumes that a firm’s pollution emission is proportional to the output the firm
produces, hence called the output-pollution approach. Most existing studies on environment
and heterogeneous firms, including Forslid et al. (2011), use the output-pollution approach.
By contrast, like Copeland and Taylor (2003), we use the input-pollution approach. In the
representative firm model, as that in Copeland and Taylor (2003), these two approaches are
mathematically equivalent and do not produce qualitatively and economically diﬀerent results.
They could be diﬀerent, mathematically and economically, in the heterogeneous firm model,
however. The key question is whether our inverted-U-shape result can only be obtained under
the input-pollution approach. This is a legitimate question as in the input-pollution approach,
more-eﬃcient firms may need less inputs, which may result in lower pollution and hence lower
investment in advanced abatement technology. In checking whether Proposition 1 may still hold
should the output-pollution approach be used, the eﬀect of the following modification to our
model must be examined:  =  (), in which  represents output rather than input as this
term includes the productivity level. Repeating the analysis before, we can obtain the optimal
output as  = p1−(1 + )1−. After the transformation Φ = 1−, where Φ is viewed
as firms’ productivity parameter, we have  = pΦ(1 + )1−, which is the same as (6) in
functional form. Thus, all the analyses are on track. Hence, we will still have the inverted-U-
shaped investment in abatement technology with the turning point at Φ = 162 or  =
¡
16
2
¢ 1
1− .
Our new result diﬀers from the existing studies not because of the diﬀerent approaches to the
modeling of pollution generation.
We now turn to the second possible reason, which is about demand structure. Forslid et al.
(2011) used the Melitz (2003) model, which has CES preference and constant markup. In such
a model, a more-productive firm always employs more inputs, which implies larger investment
in advanced abatement technology. In contrast, we adopt the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
framework of linear demand. With linear demand, although a more-productive firm always
produces more output in equilibrium, it may use less inputs and thus generates less pollution,
which implies lower investment in abatement technology. This diﬀerence explains the diﬀerent
results between our paper and prior ones.
3.3 Pollution emission and resource allocation
We now explore other outcomes of the model. Our first question is how firms diﬀer in allocating
the fraction of their inputs to pollution abatement. From (5), we obtain
 = 1−
³ 

´
(1 + ) (13)
From (7), the ratio  is constant across all firms and independent of . Thus,  = −  , and
with Proposition 1, we immediately establish the following property:
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Proposition 2. (i) All firms with   ∗ or   ∗∗ have the same fraction of inputs devoted
to pollution abatement.
(ii). For those firms with  ∈ (∗ ∗∗), the fraction of inputs devoted to pollution abatement
decreases with productivity level if   162 but increases with productivity level if   162 .
As indicated by (13), substitution occurs between  and , which is easy to understand.
If a firm decides to allocate a larger fraction of its inputs to pollution abatement, pollution
emission will be reduced. As such, a larger investment to improve the abatement technology is
not desirable. Similarly, if a firm has made a large investment on abatement technology, it will
need to worry less about the total emission generated from its production, thereby leaving more
inputs for production is optimal. Following the property of  as presented in Proposition 1, this
substitution makes it easy to understand the opposite changes in  and  with respect to a change
in productivity. For less-productive firms, that is,   162 , those with higher productivity invest
more in advanced abatement technology, which in turn allows theme to allocate a smaller fraction
of inputs to abatement and leave more to production, without generating too much pollution. By
contrast, for more-productive firms, that is,   162 , those with higher productivity invest less
on advanced abatement technology, which in turn will require them to allocate a larger fraction
of inputs to pollution abatement.
Our second question is about a firm’s emission intensity, which is defined as the total emission
divided by total output. This is a common measure of environmental performance. Let  denote
the emission intensity, then  =  . We can prove the following proposition (see Appendix):
Proposition 3. A more-productive firm has a lower emission intensity:   0.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we also show that   0, that is, more-productive firms
produce more output. Among the firms making positive investment in abatement technologies,
we can also prove (i)   0 for low-productivity firms, and (ii) under some conditions,   0
for the high-productivity firms. Thus, the monotonicity of () contributes to the decrease in
emission intensity, but it is not the only reason. The firm’s emission level may actually drops
as its productivity increases, and even if the emission level goes up, the rate of increase is lower
than that of the increase in output.
3.4 General equilibrium
The above analyses are partial equilibrium analyses as they are carried out for any given . We
now derive the equilibrium , which, together with the previous analyses, will constitute the
general equilibrium.
Using the optimal () in (9), we obtain the following individual prices:
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() =
( 
2 +
√√ if  ∈ (∗ ∗∗)
(+2)
2(+) otherwise.
We next calculate the aggregate price based on these individual prices. No firm exits the market
as there is no fixed cost of production; thus,  = 1. As the individual prices take two forms,
depending on the range of productivity level, we need to analyze the aggregate price in various
cases respectively.
First, suppose that ∗ ≤ 1 but ∗∗ ≥ 1. Then, the aggregate price is
 =
Z ∗
0
(+ 2)
2 (+ ) +
Z 1
∗
µ
2
+
√√
¶
 = 
2
µ
1 +

 ln
∗ + 

¶
+ 2
√(1−√∗)
The above condition, together with the expression of  given in (3) and that of ∗ given in (11),
determines the equilibrium . We can prove the existence of equilibrium  such that ∗ ≤ 1 but
∗∗ ≥ 1. For this equilibrium to exist,  must be suﬃciently small.6
Second, suppose that ∗∗  1. Then, the aggregate price is
 =
Z
[0∗]∪[∗∗1]
(+ 2)
2 (+ ) +
Z ∗∗
∗
µ
2
+
√√
¶

=

2
∙
1 +

 ln
(∗ + ) (+ )
(∗∗ + ) 
¸
+ 2
√(√∗∗ −√∗)
The above condition, together with the expression of  given in (3) and those of ∗ and ∗∗
given in (11), determines the equilibrium . We can prove the existence of equilibrium , under
which ∗∗  1. For this equilibrium to exist,   2
¡2 + 2¢ and  must be suﬃciently small.7
Third, suppose that ∗  1. Then, the aggregate price is
 =
Z 1
0
(+ 2)
2 (+ )  =

2
µ
1 +

 ln
+ 

¶

The above condition, together with the expression of  given in (3), determines the equilibrium
, which is  = 2
h

³
1−  ln +
´
+ 2
i
.
4 Eﬀects of environmental policies
In this subsection, we examine firms’ investment in advanced abatement technology in response to
changes in environmental policies. The type of environmental policy we focus on is the pollution
tax.  is an increasing function of  . From (10), we observe that  aﬀects  through  only, and
 ¡ ¢ = ³´ because   0. Furthermore,

 =

4
q
 − 1 +
√
2
√ · 
 (14)
6The proof is quite lengthy. It is available upon request from the authors.
7The proof is quite lengthy. It is available upon request from the authors.
12
for those firms that make positive investment in advanced abatement technology. As we cannot
obtain the closed form solution for the equilibrium  (except in the case of ∗  1, which is less
interesting), let us first examine the equilibrium eﬀects of changing pollution tax by treating 
as constant. We will return later to discuss the possible change when the general equilibrium
eﬀect is taken into consideration. Assuming  = 0 for the moment, we immediately know that

  0 if and only if   162 , which is just the turning point of the productivity level for the
inverted-U-shaped investment curve. Hence, we establish the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that 162  1 in equilibrium. Then, an increase in pollution tax results in
contrasting responses from the firms: more-productive firms (  162 ) raise their investment in
advanced abetment technology, whereas less-productive ones (  162 ) reduce their investments.
The proposition applies to the range of firms that make positive investment before the tax
increase. For firms at the margins between investing or not investing before the tax increase, we
can obtain 
∗∗
  0 and 
∗
  0. That is, low-productivity marginal firms (i.e., those just above
the critical level ∗) switch from making positive investment to making zero investment when
pollution tax increases. By contrast, high-productivity marginal firms (i.e., those just above the
critical level ∗∗) switch from making zero investment to making positive investment in response
to pollution tax increases. The intuition is as follows. In response to an increase in pollution tax,
a firm can do two things. On the one hand, the firm can reallocate more input from production
to pollution reduction. On the other hand, it can increase investment in abatement technology
to reduce the existing level of pollution. The proposition shows that less-eﬃcient firms prefer
using the former method to reduce pollution, and as a result, they correspondingly reduce their
abatement-technology investment level to save cost, whereas more-eﬃcient firms find the latter
approach more profitable. The key reason is that reallocating one unit of input from production
to pollution reduction hurts the more-eﬃcient firms’ profits more compared with the less-eﬃcient
firms’ profits due to their diﬀerence in production eﬃciency.
Forslid et al. (2011) predicted that the incentive to invest in abatement technology will
fall for all firms as pollution cost increases. As pollution tax goes up, firms will pollute less,
which reduces their incentive to invest in abatement technology (the scale eﬀect). Our prediction
is diﬀerent with regard to high-productivity firms. In Forslid et al. (2011), high-productive
firms always generate more pollution than low-productivity firms and will thus invest more in
abatement technology. By contrast, in our setting, high-productivity firms do not always have
larger investment. This diﬀerence indicates that the marginal eﬀect of further investment is lower
in their model than in our model, thus, high-productivity firms find it optimal to increase their
investment in our model but to reduce their investment in the model proposed by Forslid et al.
(2011).
We now turn to the general equilibrium eﬀect by including the indirect eﬀect through .
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From (9), every firm raises its optimal price in response to the tax increase (holding  constant,

  0). This move tends to raise . Thus,   0 or   0. From (14), this indirect eﬀect
raises the value of  . As long as

 is not too large, we can still have

  0 for  suﬃciently
close to ∗, i.e., very low productivity. Then, the qualitative aspect of Proposition 4 is still valid
(with a diﬀerent cut-oﬀ productivity level). Even if   0 for all , our finding is still and even
more in contradiction to that of Forslid et al. (2011).
5 Empirical test
We now bring the key theoretical predictions to the data. We will not test all our theoretical
results partly due to data availability and partly due to the theoretical focus of this paper.
5.1 Data
Our empirical analysis uses data drawn from the Energy Saving and Abatement Survey (ESAS),
which covers 800 manufacturing firms in China for the period between 2005 and 2009. The survey
was conducted jointly by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and Center for China in
the World Economy (CCWE) of Tsinghua University. It contains information about each firm’s
energy usage, pollutive input usage, input prices, expenditure on abatement technologies, and
others.
In testing Proposition 1, data on abatement technology expenditure are of particular use.
In the data, expenditure consists of investment in process optimization, expenses for the retro-
fitting of old equipment and purchasing of new equipment, and labor costs associated with these
activities. Expenditure is a very good measure of investment in abatement technology upgrading.
We need more information about each firm’s production and financial data in order to measure
firm productivity. However, such information is not available in the ESAS dataset. Thus, we
turn to the Annual Surveys of Manufacturing Firms in China (ASMF) conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China. This survey includes all firms with annual sales over RMB 5 million
yuan. It contains detailed accounting information of all the surveyed firms, which allows us to
estimate firm productivity. For our empirical analysis, we need to merge the ESAS data with
the ASMF data for the period of 2005 to 2009. The merged dataset consists of a balanced panel
of 800 firms. Some summary statistics are reported in Table 1. On average, each firm spends
RMB 6.6 million on abatement technology per year. This amount is significant given the total
fixed assets of an average firm, which is RMB 123 million yuan.
5.2 Regression analysis
Based on Proposition 1, we construct the following regression model:
() = 1 + 2 2 +  +  (15)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Abatement Investment 6637.4 52791.2 4000
Total Fixed Assets 123120.5 990911.6 4000
Employment 560.3 3298.6 4000
Value Added 90753.6 565512.4 4000
Note: Abatement investment, capital expenditure, and value added are in thousand RMB.
where  is abatement expenditure of firm  from industry  and province  in year ; 
is firm ’s productivity in year ;  is a vector of control variables including capital-labor ratio,
number of workers, year dummy, industry dummy, ownership dummy, and province dummy; and
 is a random term. The introduction of the productivity square term,  2, allows us to
capture the possibility of the inverted-U-shape of investment in abatement technology.
Before running the above regression, we need to first estimate each firm’s productivity level.
Following the literature, we estimate firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). TFP can be esti-
mated in three ways. We first use the simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression approach.
Specifically, we assume that production takes a Cobb-Douglas form with respect to labor and
capital, and then regress the value-added of a firm on the number of workers (L) and capital
stock (K) it has. The predicted Solow residual is used as the estimate of each firm’s (the nat-
ural log of) TFP. However, this OLS estimation of TFP may suﬀer from the simultaneity bias
problem. Specifically, input choices could be endogenously determined by productivity shocks
that are unobservable, which may lead to an upward bias in the estimation coeﬃcients of more
variable inputs, such as capital (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). For this reason, to obtain robust re-
sults, we also use two alternative estimation approaches, namely, panel fixed-eﬀect estimation and
semi-parametric estimation. In semi-parametric estimation, proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) method uses the variation in intermediate input to proxy
unobservable productivity shocks, thus reducing the simultaneity problem.
We run regression (15) using three TFP estimates, respectively. The regression results are
reported in Table 2. The first two columns report the results using Solow residual as the TFP
measurement; columns (3) and (4) present findings using the TFP obtained from the panel fixed
eﬀect estimation; and the last two columns present outcomes employing the TFP estimates based
on the LP approach. The qualitative results from all six regressions are the same: the coeﬃcient
of  is positive, whereas the coeﬃcient of  2 is negative, all statistically significant at
the 1% level.
The positive sign of the  coeﬃcient, 1, and the negative sign of the  2 coeﬃcient,
2, are necessary but not suﬃcient conditions to prove the inverted-U-shape of the abatement
technology expenditure. They only confirm the concave property of the expenditure as a function
of productivity level. If the domain of TFP is the entire real line, , i.e., in (0∞), then they are
also suﬃcient conditions. However, if the domain of TFP is only a subset of , which is the case
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Table 2: Productivity and Investment in Abatement Technology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE LP LP
 0.470*** 0.529*** 0.855*** 0.752*** 2.94×10−4*** 2.35×10−4***
(0.014 ) (0.009) (0.085) (0.067) (5.05×10−6) (4.65×10−6 )
 2 -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.093*** -0.066*** -2.69×10−9*** -2.28×10−9***
(7.70×10−4) (4.7×10−4) (0.020) (0.016) (7.24×10−11) (6.34×10−11 )
log(K/L) 0.399*** 0.465*** 0.256***
(0.016) (0.018) ( 0.013)
log(L) 0.989*** 0.949*** 0 .612***
(0.011 ) (0.016) ( 0.014)
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000
2 0.5133 0.8165 0.3696 0.6140 0.6726 0.7563
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
in the present paper, they are not suﬃcient. Following Lind and Mehlum (2010), we proceed to
test additional restrictions. A simple suﬃcient test for inverted-U-shape can be carried out by
evaluating the slope of the estimated quadratic curve at the two end points of the data range,
denoted by  and , respectively. This requires
1 + 2 ·  · 2  0 and 1 + 2 ·  · 2  0 (16)
We test the above conditions using ordinary F-test. For each of the regressions (from diﬀerent
TFP measures), we calculate the slopes at the two endpoints of the TFP measure and find that
they have the correct sign, i.e., positive at  and negative at . The corresponding F-test also
yields very significant results. The results are presented in Table 3. Thus, an inverted-U-shaped
relationship exists between abatement technology investment and productivity level.
To determine if the inverted-U-shape is driven by some outliers, we also redo the test by
excluding observations with the 1% and 5% of the highest TFP firms, respectively. The inverted-
U-shape is persistent.
As pointed out in the empirical literature on environment and productivity, the causality
may run the opposite direction. That is, investment in abatement technology may in fact aﬀect a
firm’s TFP.8 This potential endogeneity problem is less serious in our case as we are not claiming
a monotonic relationship between TFP and investment in abatement technology. Given the
diﬃculty in identifying an instrumental variable for TFP, as an alternative, we address this issue
by using one year lagged TFP and lagged TFP squared as the instrument for TFP and TFP
squared. The OLS results, reported in Table 4, show that the inverted-U-shape result is robust
8For example, Earnhart and Lizal (2011) found evidence from Czech that good environmental performance
appears to improve profitability by lowering costs. See also Gray (1987).
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Table 3: Testing Inverted-U-Shaped Curve
22 + 1 22 + 1
TFP estimated by OLS, control for KL ratio 0.469*** -0.585***
(1122.32) (198.88)
TFP estimated by OLS, control for employment 0.528*** -0.606***
(3807.81) (566.70)
TFP estimated by FE, control for KL ratio 0.838*** -0.600**
(104.59) (6.19)
TFP estimated by FE, control for employment 0.739*** -0.283
(133.25) (2.25)
TFP estimated by LP, control for KL ratio 2.94× 10−4*** -3.71× 10−4***
(3384.93) (718.07)
TFP estimated by LP, control for employment 2.35×10−4*** -3.29× 10−4***
(2551.54) (756.17)
F-statistics in parentheses.All F-statatistics are with degree of freedom of (13,946)
*** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
based on TFP estimates from OLS and LP methods. With the fixed-eﬀect TFP estimator, the
parameters of TFP and TFP squared are not statistically significant.
5.3 Emission intensity
We now test Proposition 3, which says that the emission intensity of more-productivity firms is
lower than that of less-productivity firms. In general, measuring country-level pollution emission
is diﬃculty and the task is even harder at the firm level. Data are simply not available to us.
Alternatively, we use a firm’s usage of pollution generating inputs as a proxy for its pollution
emission. Although not a perfect measure of pollution emission, it is consistent with our model
in which a firm’s pollution emission depends on its total input. Note that there are many types
of pollution generating inputs and diﬀerent inputs generate diﬀerent degrees of pollution. Hence,
without a very good conversion matrix, we use a single input, namely electricity, as the proxy
because electricity is the most commonly used input in all firms. Although using electricity
per se does not generate pollution directly, producing electricity does. As such, the amount of
electricity used by a firm represents its share of pollution generated from producing electricity in
the economy.
Then, our regressor, namely emission intensity, is the ratio of the electricity usage by a firm
to the firm’s total value added, which is inflation-adjusted. We regress this emission intensity on
three measures of TFP, respectively, controlling for electricity price and other variables as in the
main regression. Table 5 shows the results. TFP has a clear negative impact on the emission
intensity of the firms, confirming our theoretical prediction.
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Table 4: Productivity and Investment in Abatement Technology: Lagged TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE LP LP
 0.434*** 0.480*** 0.167 0.083 3.47×10−4*** 2.80×10−4***
(0.017 ) (0.011) (1.03) (0.129) ( 7.19×10−6) ( 6.46×10−6 )
 2 -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.031 0.038 -4.02×10−9*** -3.52×10−9***
( 0.001) (0.0006) (0.020) (0.045) (1.26×10−10) ( 1.09×10−10 )
log(K/L) 0.390*** 0.477*** 0.245***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015)
log(L) 0.955*** 0.947*** 0.618***
(0.014 ) (0.018) ( 0.016)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
2 0.4870 0.7729 0.3544 0.5933 0.6639 0.7521
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
Table 5: Productivity and Electricity Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE LP LP
 -0.0280*** -0.0316*** -0.2456*** -0.2463*** -9.44×10−6*** 6.77×10−6***
(0 .0 0 3 8 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 8 ) ( 0 .0 1 7 7 ) ( 0 .0 1 7 6 ) ( 1 .6 7×10−6) ( 1 .7 7×10−6 )
log(K/L) -0.0124 -0.0188*** -0.0072
(0 .0 0 7 9 ) ( - 0 .0 0 8 ) ( 0 .0 0 8 0 )
log(L) -0.0675*** -0.0603*** -0.038
(0 .0 0 9 3 ) ( 0 .0 1 7 6 ) ( 0 .0 3 3 )
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000 1900 1900
2 0.4992 0.5055 0.5157 0.5203 0.4962 0.4985
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
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6 Conclusion
This paper incorporates pollution emissions (Copeland and Taylor, 2003) and endogenous in-
vestments in abatement technology into a model with firm heterogeneity in productivity and
endogenous markup (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). The analysis shows how firms with diﬀerent
productivity levels optimally choose the level of investment in advanced abatement technology. In
particular, we find that the incentive to invest in such technology is positively related to the pol-
lution emission that a firm generates and takes an inverted-U-shaped curve against productivity.
Nevertheless, more-productive firms always have lower emission intensity than less-productive
firms. In response to a rise in pollution tax, less-productive firms reduce their investment,
whereas more-productive firms raise their investment.
The present paper demonstrates the theoretical possibility of the inverted-U-shaped invest-
ment in abatement technology, which is supported by China data based on a survey. The result
may not hold for every industry and in every country. It is therefore important to find necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the inverted-U-shape result to hold. Examining the welfare eﬀects
of strengthening environmental regulation and deriving the optimal pollution tax policy are also
worth further investigation. These are left for future research.
More rigorous empirical research should be carried out in future research when richer data
are available. For example, we should employ a more accurate data or estimates of individual
firms’ pollution emission level in order to have a better test of the relationship between emission
intensity and productivity.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
From the production function, we have 1− = 2(1+) . From (7) and (8) we get
 =  =

(1 + )
µ 
1− 
¶1− µ
1

¶1−
=
µ 
1− 
¶1− µ
1

¶1− 
2 (( + 1) + ) 
We can easily see that ((1+))  0. From the expression of optimal , we have
(1 + ) = max{ 
2
√− }
Thus, ((1+))  0 except at the non-diﬀerentiable kink point. Thus,   0.
In fact, we can also show   0. Substituting the expression of optimal  from (10) into 
in (8), we get  = 12
³√−2√ ´ for  ∈ (∗ ∗∗), and  = 2(+) for  ∈ (∗ ∗∗). Both are
increasing functions of .
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